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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, . . 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v- Case No. 18250 
THOMAS DEAN LAKEY, . . 
Defenaant-Appellant. . . 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with Theft by Deception in 
violation of Utah Code Ann., § 76-6-405(1) and § 76-6-412 
(1953), as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury and convicted of 
Theft by Deception on October 29, 1981 in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court, the Honorable George E. Ballif presiding. 
Sentence was imposed on January 22, 1982 ordering appellant to 
be confined for an indeterminate term of not less than one nor 
more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent seeks an order of this Court 
affirming the judgment of the court below. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The appellant approached Richard Ryan, a sales 
representative for clothing ·'companies, at a trade show in Salt 
Lake City (R. 96). Appellant asked Ryan to show him some 
samples as he was interested in buying them (R. 97). On 
January 30, 1981 after a telephone conversation confirming 
that appellant wished to make a purchase and at appellant's 
request, Ryan appeared at appellant'a store in Provo (R. 97). 
Ryan took with him some clothing samples which he sold to 
appellant at cost for $2,763.18 (R. 98, 102, 156). The 
parties had previously agreed during their phone conversation 
that the sales price would be paid .in full on delivery (R. 
98). Appellant paid for the goods with a personal check which 
he requested Ryan not to cash that day, but to deposit it in 
his bank account instead (R. 98). Ryan understood that the 
check would clear appellant's account but that if it were 
cashed that day, problems would be created with other checks 
issued by the appellant (R. 99). Appellant told Ryan that he 
would pay cash if Ryan would return on the following Monday 
(R. 136). Ryan could not return on Monday because he was 
leaving town and agreed to take the check and deposit it in 
his account (R. 99). Ryan would not have left the clothing 
'1tlth appellant if he had known the check would not be paid (R. 
99). That day, after depositing the check, Ryan left town to 
travel to Idaho. Upon his return, Ryan discovered the check 
-2-
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given to him by appellant had not been paid (R. 101). The 
check was twice presented to appellant's bank and returned 
marked "Insufficient Funds" and, later, "Account Closed" (R. 
106). 
An employee of the bank in which appellant's account 
was located testified that the account was closed on February 
10, 1981 because of the excessive number of checks presented 
for payment against insufficient funds (R. 106, 116, 117). 
The bank's copy of a statement of the status of appellant's 
account dated January 5, 1981 showed the balance to be 
$1,526.04. Although four deposits were made during the month 
of January, at no time was the balance greater than it was on 
January 5 (R. 114). During January, other checks drawn·on 
insufficient funds were returned unpaid by appellant's bank. 
Each time such a check was returned, the bank mailed a notice 
to appellant informing him of that action. Neither these 
notices nor the January 5, 1981 statement was returned to the 
bank as undeliverable by the postal service (R. 113). 
Appellant testified that he knew there were insufficient funds 
in his account on the day he issued the check to Ryan (R. 
145). 
As of the date of trial, Ryan had not been paid for 
t!be merchandise nor had it been returned to him (R. 102). The 
goods were never offered to Ryan and by February 28, 1981 
approximately two-thirds of the goods were no longer in 
-3-
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appellant's store (R. 154). Appellant did offer to pay Ryan 
10 per cent of the amount due per month after the charge 
against him was filed; howev_er, Ryan did not accept any 
payments (R. 156). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS 
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT. 
The statute under which appellant was convicted 
provides that: 
a person commits theft if he obtains or 
exercises control over property of another 
by deception and with a purpose to deprive 
him there of. 
Utah Code Ann., § 76-6-405 (1953), as amended. The terms used 
in this section are defined in Utah Code Ann., § 76-6-401 
(1953), as amended, as follows: 
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the 
conscious object: 
(a) To withhold property permanently 
or for so extended a period or to use 
under such circumstances that a 
substantial portion of its economic value, 
or of the use and benefit thereof, would 
be lost; or 
. . . 
(c) To dispose of the property under 
circumstances that make it unlikely that 
the owner will recover it. 
( 5) "Deception" occurs when a person 
intentionally: 
(a) Creates or confirms by words or 
conduct an impression of law or fact that 
-4-
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is false and that the actor does not 
believe to be true and that is likely to 
affect the judgment of another in the 
transaction1 or 
(b) fails to correct a false 
impression of law or fact that the actor 
previously created or confirmed by words 
or conduct that is likely to affect the 
judgment of another and that the actor 
does not now believe to be true1 or • • • 
(e) Promises performance that is 
likely to affect the judgment of another 
in the transaction, which performance the 
actor does not intend to perform or knows 
will not be performed1 provided, however, 
that failure to perform the promise in 
issue without other evidence of intent or 
knowledge is not sufficient proof that the 
actor did not intend to perform or knew 
the promise would not be performed. 
A. THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE 
THAT THE APPELLANT OBTAINED PROPERTY 
BY DECEPTION. 
Under the statutory definition of deception in 
subsection (S)(a) above, the appellant must have created a 
false impression in the mind of Ryan that the appellant did 
not believe to be true. This definition was met by the 
evidence that appellant did not inform Ryan that there were 
not sufficient funds in appellant's account to cover the 
check. Ryan testified that he understood that appellant had 
sufficient funds to cover the check issued to him but that 
other checks had been written that would be dishonored if Ryan 
cashed his check on the day of issue. According to Ryan's 
testimony, appellant only went so far as to request Ryan not 
-~ 
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to cash the check so as not to •mess up" his other 
transactions. Appellant never stated in so many words that 
the check was not good that day. Ryan was never told not to 
cash the check because he would not get paid1 he was told not 
I 
to cash the check because it might cause appellant problems 
with his account when other checks were later presented. 
Silence on the part of appellant concerning the fact that 
there were insufficient funds left Ryan with a false 
impression that there were sufficient funds. 
Appellant asserts as a defense that "at no time did 
[he] represent that the check was good at that time" 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 5). Neither did he represent, however, 
that the check was not good. Appellant, in fact, said nothing 
relating to the current status of his account. The only 
reference was to what would happen in the future if Ryan 
cashed the check that day. 
This Court has said that "fraud by silence, when 
circumstances require honest disclosure, may constitute 
grounds for prosecution as well as false statements." 
Ballaine v. District Court, 107 Utah 247, 153 P.2d 265, 268 
(1944). In the instant case, honest disclosure was clearly 
required because the representation created a false impression 
t-hat the appellant knew was not true. Appellant admitted at 
trial that he knew at the time he issued the check to Ryan 
that there were not sufficient funds in the account. Also, 
-~ 
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the bank had mailed to appellant a statement of the status of 
his account and notices of other checks that were not paid 
because of insufficient funds. Appellant's silence on the 
fact of the status of his account was deception because he 
knew what the status of the account was, and without regard to 
that knowledge, proceeded to create the impression in Ryan's 
mind that the check was good. 
Appellant, of course, has his own version of these 
facts. He testified that Ryan knew he could not cash the 
check because there were insufficient funds. Appellant 
asserts that the impression of fact he created was that he 
intended to make some deposits so that the check would be paid 
if it was deposited in Ryan's checking account. Even assuming 
that the jury believed these to be the facts, they could still 
find that there was a deception because an impression of fact 
was created that did not turn out to be true. No deposit was 
made to appellant's account that raised the balance enough to 
cover the check issued to Ryan. 
Appellant, however, contends that, even if he 
created the impression that deposits would be made and that 
impression was false, he did not act knowing that he was 
creating a false impression. Appellant asserts that he did 
~Qt know that he would not receive money that had been 
promised to him by an investor. In fact, appellant argues, he 
fully believed he would receive money from this investor. 
-7-
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The only evidence presented at trial on this issue 
was that offered by appellant's own testimony. Appellant 
testified that he had received many promises of cash to invest 
in his business but that none of these promises had ever 
materialized either before or after January 30, 1981. 
Appellant argues that because no evidence was introduced that 
was directly contrary to the assertion that he believed he 
would receive money to deposit in his bank account, then the 
jury must have believed his testimony to be fact. If the jury 
believed this testimony, according to the appellant, then 
there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that he knew the check would not be paid. This Court 
has said, however, that: 
[t]he evidence relied upon by the jury 
need not refute contrary allegations made 
by the defendant, as long as the jury 
verdict is supported by substantial 
evidence • • • the burden of proof 
applicable in all criminal cases [is] 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The key word 
••• is that of nreasonable." In [this] 
case, the jury simply did not deem the 
defendant's explanation of his actions as 
being "reasonable." 
State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 229, 232 (1980). Although no 
evidence was introduced that directly contradicted the 
appellant's testimony, there was substantial evidence 
supporting the opposite conclusion. Appellant testified that 
he had been given many promises of cash to invest in his 
-8-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
business but none had ever materialized either before or after 
the date on which he purchased the goods from Ryan. From this 
testimony~ the jury could reasonably infer not only that 
appellant did not know he would receive the money but that he 
knew in all probability he would not receive the money before 
Ryan's check was presented for payment. In the face of 
numerous broken promises, it was not reasonable for appellant 
to believe that the promises would be fulfilled on this 
occasion. 
Appellant further asserts that the jury was not free 
to reach any conclusion other than that his version of the 
facts was true. The jurors, however: 
were not obligated to accept as true 
defendant's own version of the evidence 
nor his self-exculpating statements as to 
his intentions and his conduct. They were 
entitled to use their own judgment as to 
what evidence they would believe and to 
draw any reasonable inferences therefrom. 
State v. Gorlick, Utah, 605 P.2d 761 (1979). The jury could 
reasonably have believed that the appellant here knew that 
there would not be funds in his account to cover the check 
issued to Ryan because appellant knew that the funds were 
insufficient at the time he issued the check and that the 
promise of money from investors was not reliable. They were 
not bound to believe that appellant even had any potential 
investors as he testified. The weight and credibility of 
-9-
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the testimony was a matter for the jury to determine. State 
v. Daniels, Utah, 584 P.2d 880, 883 (1978). See also: State 
v. Asay, Utah, 631 P.2d 861 ,·(1901)1 State v. Gorlick, Utah, 
605 P.2d 761 (1979). They have done so by finding the 
appellant guilty of the offense. 
The element of the offense requiring that the 
representation be likely to affect the judgment of another in 
the transaction was clearly proved by the evidence. Ryan 
testified that he thought appellant had funds to cover the 
check on that day and that if he had thought that the check 
was not good he never woulo have left the goods at the store. 
Ryan relied on the representation made by appellant that the 
check would be paid if it were cashed on the day of the sale. 
As a mere courtesy, Ryan refrained from cashing the check so 
that appellant would not run the risk of other checks being 
dishonored. The judgment to leave the goods with appellant on 
this basis was clearly influenced by Ryan's understanding that 
he could, in fact, have cashed the check that day if he so 
desired. 
B. THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE 
THAT THE APPELLANT OBTAINED PROPERTY 
FROM RYAN WITH A PURPOSE TO DEPRIVE 
HIM THEREOF. 
To prevail on a claim of insufficient evidence, the 
appellant must establish: 
-10-
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that the evidence was so inconclusive or 
insubstantial that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed the crime charged. 
State v. Kerekes, Utah, 622 P.2d 1161, 1168 (1980) [citation 
omitted]. On review: 
this Court [must] review the evidence and 
all inferences which may be reasonably 
drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the verdict of the jury. 
Id. Reviewing the facts in the instant case in the light most 
favorable to the verdict establishes that the jury may have 
reasonably concluded that the appellant intended to defraud 
Ryan. These facts are that: (1) the appellant knew he did 
not have the funds in his account to cover the check when he 
issued it7 (2) appellant created an impression that he did 
have sufficient funds in his account7 (3) the check was not 
paid; (4) appellant never offered to return Ryan's 
merchandise1 (5) approximately two-thirds of the goods were no 
longer in appellant's possession by February 28, 1981 yet Ryan 
had not been paid for any of the 9oods7 (6) appellant made 
sure Ryan understood the sale could not take place that day 
unless the check was accepted, thus taking advantage of the 
fact that Ryan was going out of town and could not return to 
negotiate the sale on a later day; (7) appellant did not 
inform Ryan of any problems with payment when he invited him 
to come to the shop that day with the merchandise although 
-11-
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he knew Ryan wanted to make the sale of the goods or not come 
at all. 
From the foregoing facts, it is clear that the 
evidence introduced at trial was not only sufficient, but 
overwhelmingly so. That the jury may have chosen to disblieve 
the appellant's testimony is not sufficient reason to conclude 
that the evidence upon which the verdict was based was so 
insubstantial that they must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt. The evidence presented that supports the verdict was 
more than sufficient to sustain appellant's conviction. From 
that evidence, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that 
appellant possessed the requisite intent to deprive Ryan of 
the merchandise at the time of the transaction. 
In the alternative, appellant argues that his offer 
to pay 10 per cent of the purchase price per month negates the 
evidence that he possessed the intent to permanently deprive. 
This offer, however, came only after investigation had begun 
/ 
and a determination to charge the appellant with the offense 
had been made. The fact that an of fer of restitution was made 
after the appellant discovered he was in jeopardy does not 
prove what his intent was at the time of the incident. Also, 
such an of fer does not change the fact that Ryan was actually 
defrauded. This Court said in State v. Casperson, 71 Utah 68, 
75, 262 P. 294, 296 (1927) that: 
-12-
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The actuaJ. fraud and prejudice required 
• • • is determined according to the 
situation of the victim immediately after 
he parts with his ·property. • • • [I]f he 
then stands without the right or thing it 
was pretended he would then have, he has 
been defrauded and prejudiced by reason of 
the false pretense, and the offense is 
complete, notwithstanding thereafter he 
may regain his property, or the person 
obtaining it or another compensates him, 
or he thereafter obtains full redress in 
some manner not contemplated when he 
parted with his property. 
In Casperson, the defendant was convicted of obtaining 
property by false pretenses. The conviction was reversed by 
this Court because the victims had received what they 
bargained for and had lost nothing. 
The above language was quoted by this Court in a 
more recent case in which the defendant was convicted of theft 
by deception. In that case, the Court found that the victims 
had not received what they bargained for but reversed the 
conviction on other grounds. State v. Walton, Utah, 646 P.2d 
689, 691 (1982). 
In the instant case, the victim, at the time he 
parted with his property, had only received in return a 
worthless check. At the time of the transaction, Ryan did not 
receive what he bargained for and was therefore defrauded. 
'mle fact that the appellant later attempted to make 
restitution does not change the situation at the time of the 
transaction. If the deception would have been complete where 
-13-
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Ryan had actually received restitution, then it must also be 
complete where he has received none. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to' 
show that the appellant received property by deception with a 
purpose to deprive Ryan thereof. Regardless of the fact that 
the evidence was not directly contrary to the testimony of the 
appellant, it was substantial enough to support the conclusion 
that appellant had created a deception. The j·ury was free to 
believe or not believe the testimony presented by the 
appellant as explanation of his behavior. If the jury chose 
to disbelieve that testimony, they could reasonably infer that 
the appellant knew he was creating a false impression at the 
time of sale. 
The appellant has not shown that the evidence was so 
inconclusive that reasonable minds must have held a reasonable 
doubt as to his guilt. Reviewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the verdict reveals, in fact, that it was 
more than sufficient to support the verdict. Where the 
evidence shows that the appellant obtained property by 
deception with a purpose to deprive at the time of the 
transaction, evidence that he later attempted to make 
restitution does not change the fact that the victim was 
defrauded. The veroict of the jury, therefore, should be 
affirmed. 
-14-
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1982. 
Respectfully submitted this 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
day of December, 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact 
copies of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to Kent o. 
Willis, Attorney for Appellant, 43 East 200 North, P.O. Box 
•L", Provo, Utah, 84603, this 6:!!:::::. day of December, 1982. 
/ 
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